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proach avoids postponement of the injured party's recovery
and affords greater protection to the litigant's right not to
be defamed. The integrity of the judicial privilege is not
threatened by the Viera approach because material alle-
gations may still be made without fear of liability. Further-
more, the Viera rule affects only the procedural means to
recovery, not the determination of whether a statement is
actionable.
Perhaps the most significant advantage provided by the
Viera rationale is that it discourages irresponsible litigation.
Granting a more convenient and economical method of en-
forcing his cause of action to the defamed party would force
the parties in litigation to be more precise and responsible in
their pleadings and thus avoid unnecessary injury.
J. David Garrett
MINOR'S MARRIAGE CONTRACT-ABSOLUTE NULLITY?
A sixteen-year-old unemancipated minor and her future
husband executed a prenuptial agreement renouncing the
community of acquets or gains.1 The father of the bride re-
fused to join his wife and daughter in signing the marriage
contract. When the husband instituted a divorce action thir-
teen years later, the wife reconvened for a partition of the
community property, alleging that the separate property
agreement was invalid due to her minority at the time of its
execution and the absence of her father's assistance and sig-
1. A prenuptial agreement, commonly referred to as a marriage contract,
is an agreement entered into by a couple stipulating the financial and prop-
erty aspects of the marriage. S. LITVINOFF & W. TPTE, LOUISIANA LEGAL
TRANSACTIONS AND THE CIVIL LAW OF JURIDICAL ACTS 77 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as LITVINOFF & TftTE]. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2325 permits couples to
stipulate property regimes of their own design provided "they be not con-
trary to good morals." LA. CIV. CODE art. 2332 provides that the community
of gains exists by operation of law when there is no stipulation to the con-
trary prior to the marriage. Marriage contracts are governed by strict re-
quirements. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2328 provides that they must be by notarial
act and article 2329 provides that they cannot be altered after the marriage,
except that couples moving to this state are given a one-year period in which
to make a marriage contract. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329. See H. DAGGETT, THE
COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA 118 (1945), in which the writer
suggests that post-nuptial contracts would make it possible for spouses dis-
satisfied with the community property system to change it and thus prevent
"possible friction" in their marriage.
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nature on the document. The trial court's holding that the
marriage contract was an absolute nullity2 was reversed by
the First Circuit Court of Appeal, which held that the con-
tract was valid from its inception.3 In reversing the first cir-
cuit and reinstating the decision of the lower court, the Loui-
siana Supreme Court held that the marriage contract entered
into by the unemancipated minor without the consent of both
parents was null. Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 323 So. 2d 120 (La.
1975).
Unemancipated minors in Louisiana are under a general
incapacity to contract except in certain instances set forth in
Civil Code article 1785.4 The incapacity5 is based on the pre-
sumption that minors are unable to appreciate the conse-
quences of juridical acts,6 and it protects minors by allowing
them to plead their minority and escape liability stemming
from contracts entered without the assistance of their tu-
tors.7 Ordinary contracts of minors are relative nullities and
therefore are ratifiable. 8
2. Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, No. 28,545 (Family Court, Parish of East Baton
Rouge, Jan. 2, 1975).
3. Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 312 So. 2d 107 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
4. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1785: "Minors emancipated may contract in the
cases already provided by law, and when not emancipated, their contracts
are valid, if made with the intervention of their tutors, and with the assent of
a family meeting, in the cases where by law it is required .... His stipulations
in a marriage contract, if made with the consent of those whose authority is
in such case required by law, are also valid.... In all other cases, the minor is
incapacitated from contracting, but his contracts may be rendered valid by
ratification, either expressed or implied, in the manner and on the terms
stated in this title under the head: Of Nullity or Rescission of Agreements."
5. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1864-80 which deal with the relief afforded
minors on account of lesionary contracts, and articles 2221-31 which deal with
the action of nullity or rescission which can be brought by minors.
6. For an excellent discussion of this presumption, see Comment, Con-
tractual Incapacity in the Louisiana Civil Code, 47 TUL. L. REV. 1093 (1973).
7. The term "tutor" encompasses a parent who administers the estate of
a minor child. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 221. For cases wherein a minor escapes
liability, see International Accountants Soc'y v. Santana, 166 La. 671, 117 So.
768 (1928); LaPorte v. Clesi, Inc., 197 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967);
Reeme v. Motors Securities Co., 51 So. 2d 833 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951); D. H.
Holmes Co. v. Rena, 34 So. 2d 813 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1948); Kothe v. Von
Behren, 5 So. 2d 571 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942).
8. LITVINOFF & T9TE at 74; Note, 38 TUL. L. REV. 755 (1964). LA. CIv.
CODE art. 1785 provides that a ratification can be express or implied. LA. CIV.
CODE art. 2272 provides that an express ratification occurs through a recog-
nitive or confirmative act curing the defect. Implied or tacit ratification
occurs through the running of prescription. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2221,
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Article 1785 specifically provides that a minor's "stipula-
tions in a marriage contract, if made with the consent of
those whose authority is in such case required by law, are
also valid." Article 2330 elaborates:
The minor, who is capable of contracting matrimony, may
give his consent to any agreements which this contract is
susceptible of; and the agreements entered into and the
donations he has made by the same, are valid, provided
that, if he be not emancipated, he has been assisted in the
agreement by those persons whose consent is necessary to
his marriage.9
Before the instant case, no decisive jurisprudence interpreted
the effect of article 2330 upon the validity of marriage con-
tracts entered into by minors without parental consent. 10 If
article 2330 is read literally, marriage contracts executed
without assistance by unemancipated minors should be valid
because Civil Code article 11211 allows minors in Louisiana to
marry validly without the consent of their parents. Although
article 97 requires that minors have parental consent to mar-
ry, 12 article 112 provides that a marriage lacking such consent
3542. There is a conflict as to whether five or ten years is the applicable
prescriptive period. The jurisprudence has used both; in Succession of
Sallier, 115 La. 97, 38 So. 929 (1905) the ten year period was used; the five
year period was used in Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Schwob, 203 La. 175, 13 So. 2d
782 (1943) and in Savoie v. Duplantis, 167 So. 127 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936).
Actions taken by the minor after reaching majority have, in some cases, been
construed as an implied ratification. E.g., Taylor v. Rundell, 2 La. Ann. 367
(1847); Navarro v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 264 So. 2d 691 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972);
Butto v. Central Fin. Co., 73 So. 2d 44 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954). Also, the plea
of minority is available only to the minor or his representative, and the
contract produces ordinary effects until it is declared null. Scott v. Continen-
tal Ins. Co., 259 So. 2d 391 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972); Harris v. Ward, 224 So. 2d
517 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
9. Emphasis added.
10. In Succession of Wilder, 22 La. Ann. 219 (1870), the court dealt with
the validity of a minor's marriage contract that had been executed without
parental consent. The contract had been executed in Mississippi and the
decision as to its validity was grounded upon that state's common law princi-
ples.
11. LA. CIV. CODE art. 112: "The marriage of minors, contracted without
the consent of the father and mother, can not for that cause be annulled, if it
is otherwise contracted with the formalities prescribed by law; but such want
of consent shall be a good cause for the father and mother to disinherit their
children thus married, if they think proper."
12. LA. CIv. CODE art. 97: "The minor of either sex, who has attained the
NOTES
cannot be annulled for that cause.1 3 The discrepancy stems
from the divergence by the Louisiana redactors from the
French view, which permits non-consenting parents to bring
an action to annul such marriages.14 By rejecting the French
remedy, the redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code apparently
chose to make marriages contracted by minors without pa-
rental consent valid. 15 If parental consent is not necessary for
the validity of a minor's marriage, then under the provisions
of article 2330, arguably none should be necessary for the
validity of his marital property agreement.
In the instant case,'6 however, the Louisiana Supreme
Court rejected that argument, and found that the purpose of
article 112,17 which prohibits the annulment of minors' mar-
riages by non-consenting parents, is solely to implement two
public policies: to uphold the validity of marriages whenever
possible and to avoid branding children as illegitimate. The
court felt that the marital property agreement must be
viewed in light of another public policy, that of protecting
minors in their contractual relationships, and it stated that
article 2330 must be interpreted as "an expression of this
state's strong public policy of protecting minors. . .. ",8
The court's decision that parental assistance is necessary
for a minor's marriage contract seems correct. For the court
to decide otherwise, it would have had to ignore the basic
principle that minors are incapable of understanding the con-
sequences of their juridical acts and are in need of assistance.
Although the same principle would seem to require that
competent age to marry, must have received the consent of his father and
mother or of the survivor of them; and if they are both dead, the consent of
his tutor. He must furnish proof of this consent to the officer to whom he
applies for permission to marry."
13. The parents' only recourse is that LA. Civ. CODE art. 112 allows them
to disinherit their children if they marry without consent. See, e.g., Stephens
v. Duckett, 111 La. 979, 36 So. 89 (1904).
14. Code Napoleon art. 182 was not adopted by the Louisiana redactors.
It provides, "A marriage contracted without the consent of the father and
mother, of the ancestors, or of the family council, in cases where such consent
was necessary, can only be impeached by those whose consent was requisite,
or by such of the two married persons as stood in need of that consent"
(translation by a Barrister of the Inner Temple; London 1824).
15. The jurisprudence is in accord. See State v. Golden, 210 La. 347, 26 So.
2d 837 (1946); Delpit v. Young, 51 La. Ann. 923, 25 So. 547 (1899).
16. Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 323 So. 2d 120 (La. 1975).
17. See text of LA. CIV. CODE art. 112 in note 11, supra.
18. 323 So. 2d at 125.
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minors be assisted in contracting marriage,19 the derogation
in article 112 from this principle can be explained by the
countervailing public policy of upholding marriages and pro-
tecting the legal status of children which, as the court indi-
cated, is not served by the validation of marital property
agreements entered into by minors without parental consent.
Moreover, it may be inferred from articles 1785 and 2330 that
the redactors contemplated parental consent and assistance
for a valid marriage contract. 20 Article 1748,21 which limits
the capacity of an unemancipated minor to make donations in
a marriage contract, supports this inference. The consent re-
quirement in article 1748 is parallel to that in article 2330,
making it susceptible to the same attack that can be made on
article 2330, i.e., no parental consent was intended to be
necessary because none is needed for a valid marriage. How-
ever, article 1748 goes one step further and states that "[i]f
the relations, whose consent is necessary be dead, the minor
not emancipated can not give without the authorization of a
court of justice"; its mandatory language clearly points out
that an unemancipated minor cannot act without assis-
tance.
22
19. LA. CIv. CODE art. 86 provides: "The law considers marriage in no
other view than as a civil contract." The purpose of this article is to remove
the institution of marriage from the realm of religious or ecclesiastical law
and make it subject only to civil authority. Hurry v. Hurry, 144 La. 877, 81 So.
378 (1919).
20. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2330 should be read in conjunction with the other
code articles which make reference to minors and marriage contracts. See,
e.g., article 2226 which provides: "A minor is not restituable against the
engagements stipulated in his marriage contract, if they were entered into
with the consent or in the presence of those whose consent is requisite for the
validity of his marriage." (The phrase "or in the presence" is an error in the
English translation of the French text and should read "with the assis-
tance.") It is arguable that the consent requirement is non-existent because
of article 112, but one wonders why the redactors kept referring to a consent
requirement. One writer suggests that this confusion is the result of poor
drafting and that the spirit of article 2330 should be pursued rather than
construing it literally and depriving it of any meaning. The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts fbr the 1974-1975 Term-Matrimonial Regimes, 36
LA. L. REV. 409, 409-11 (1976).
21. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1748: "A minor, not emancipated, can give only
with the consent of those relations whose consent is requisite for the validity
of the marriage; and with that consent, he or she can give all that the law
permits a married person of full age to give to his or her consort. ... ."
22. For additional analysis of the consent requirement in article 2330, see
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-
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By reinstating the family court judgment, 23 the supreme
court apparently held that the Wilkinsons' defective marriage
contract was an absolute nullity.24 However, the court relied
heavily on the law and jurisprudence governing the ordinary,
relatively null contracts of minors 25 and failed to explain why
the contract in question was an absolute nullity. Deciding
whether a contract is an absolute or relative nullity is a
crucial determination because absolute nullities never pos-
sess legal existence and cannot be ratified. 26 The interest
being protected is the criterion for deciding the type of nul-
lity. If the law seeks to protect the interests of an individual,
for example, a minor or an interdict, then that person's con-
tract is only a relative nullity; if the public interest is at
stake, it is an absolute nullity.
27
In the case of a minor's marriage contract, determining
which type of nullity exists is difficult because both interests
are present. The purpose of a marriage contract is not only to
establish a property regime for the couple, but also to insure
stability in property rights. This latter goal is of paramount
public interest 2s because persons dealing with a married
couple have an interest in knowing what that couple's prop-
erty regime is for commercial and credit purposes. Planiol
Matrimonial Regimes, 36 LA. L. REV. 409, 409-11 (1976). Professor Pascal
stresses that a minor needs the assistance of a mature person having the
minor's welfare in mind if he wants to enter into a contract departing from
the legal property regime.
23. See text at note 2, supra.
24. The supreme court states, "The Family Court decreed that the pre-
nuptial contract was absolutely null .... " and concludes, "Accordingly, the
decision of the court of appeal is reversed, and the judgment of the Family
Court of East Baton Rouge is reinstated .. " 323 So. 2d at 122, 127.
25. The court quotes extensively from Harris v. Ward, 224 So. 2d 517 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1969), and repeats the warning, "[Olne who deals with a minor
does so at his peril," from LaPorte v. Clesi, Inc., 197 So. 2d 419, 423 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1967). Both of these cases dealt with the ordinary contracts of
minors.
26. LITVINOFF & TtTE at 74; 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, pt. 1 nos.
326-49 at 218-33 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959); Comment, Contractual
Incapacity in the Louisiana Civil Code, 47 TUL. L. REV. 1093, 1124-30 (1973);
Note, 38 TUL. L. REV. 755 (1964).
27. Palmer, Contractual Incapacity in the Louisiana Civil Code-Intro-
duction, 47 TUL. L. REV. 1085, 1088 (1973); Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Schwob, 203
La. 175, 179, 13 So. 2d 782, 783 (1943). See also Vaughan v. Christine, 3 La.
Ann. 328 (1848).
28. Comment, Contractual Incapacity in the Louisiana Civil Code, 47
TUL. L. REV. 1093, 1132 (1973).
1976]
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persuasively argued that the marriage contract should not be
a relative nullity and thereby have its validity in a state of
uncertainty:
Its special nature makes relative nullity impossible. It
can be only either fully valid or absolutely void. Also the
matrimonial agreement must be clear from the beginning
of the marriage. If the marriage contract is valid, it is
fully respected; if it is void, spouses are married under
the statutory system. The uncertainty created by relative
nullity is incompatible with marriage contract.
29
Thus, although both individual and public interests are in-
volved, the public interest should prevail in determining
whether the defective marriage contract is an absolute or
relative nullity.
30
If the court did mean that the contract was an absolute
nullity, its discussion of the issues of prescription and estop-
pel was improper, since it discussed these issues as though
the contract with which it was dealing were a relative nullity.
The husband's contention was that the wife had lost her right
to attack the contract since prescription had run. The court
disposed of this contention by finding that she could not have
sued her husband to attack the validity of the contract due to
the exclusive listing of La. R.S. 9:291, 3 1 which prohibits a
married woman from suing her husband during the mavriage
except in four specific instances. Whereas the court stressed
that prescription does not run against a cause of action that
cannot be exercised, 32 it could have simply disposed of the
prescription plea with the answer that prescription does not
run against absolute nullities.
33
The husband further contended that the wife was es-
29. 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, pt. 1 no. 838 at 47 (11th ed. La. St. L.
Inst. transl. 1959).
30. See Palmer, Contractual Incapacity in the Louisiana Civil Code-=
Introduction, 47 TUL. L. REV. 1085, 1088-92 (1973).
31. LA. R.S. 9:291 (1960) provides "As long as the marriage continues and
the spouses are not separated judicially a married woman may not sue her
husband except for: (1) A separation of property; (2) The restitution and
enjoyment of her paraphernal property; (3) A separation from bed and board;
or (4) A divorce." The court reiterated its position that this list is exclusive
and not illustrative. See, e.g., Black v. Black, 288 So. 2d 611 (La. 1974).
32. 323 So. 2d at 125-26. See, e.g., Soirez v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 168 So. 2d
418 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
33. See authorities in note 26, supra.
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topped from denying the validity of the contract due to a
reconciliation following a separation in 1966, the husband
alleging that as part of this reconciliation the wife had admit-
ted the validity of the contract. The court disposed of the
second contention by finding that the evidence conflicted and
that the husband had failed to prove the elements of an
"estoppel in pais" claim. 34 Although speaking of "estoppel in
pais," the court actually seemed to be referring to the possi-
bility of a ratification of the contract through actions on the
wife's part.35 Nevertheless, whether the court means "estop-
pel in pais" or ratification is immaterial, because the proper
disposition of this issue is simply that absolute nullities can-
not be ratified.
36
The practical effect of Wilkinson is that minors cannot
derogate by contract from the community of acquets or
gains without parental assistance, even though they can
marry without parental consent. If the minor fails to obtain
parental assistance, the marriage contract is ineffective and
the community property regime takes effect through supple-
tive law.37 This unintended result can be avoided if the par-
ties are informed properly before the marriage takes place,
and a means of dispersing this essential information can be
found in Act 693 of 1975. This act provides that the Attorney
General shall prepare a summary of the existing matrimonial
regime laws which "shall emphasize the possibility of con-
tracting expressly a regime of one's choosing before marriage
" . . ;38 the marriage license clerk must furnish prospective
spouses with a copy of this summary. To make it complete,
the Attorney General should include a warning to minors
that they must have parental consent if they desire to set up
a valid property regime of their own design.
Jeanette K. Giddens
34. "Estoppel in pais" is defined as "the effect of the voluntary conduct of
a party whereby he is barred from asserting rights against another party
justifiably relying on such conduct and who has changed his position to his
detriment as a result of such reliance." Babin v. Montegut Ins. Agency, Inc.,
271 So. 2d 642, 645 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972). The three elements are: (1) a
representation by conduct or word; (2) justifiable reliance; and (3) a change in
position to one's detriment because of the reliance.
35. Ratification of a contract can occur through actions that evidence an
intent to affirm the contract. See cases in note 8, supra.
36. See authorities in note 26, supra.
37. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2325, 2332.
38. La. Acts 1975, No. 693.
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